NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 17 | Number 1

Article 13

12-1-1938

Corporate Reorganization -- Bondholders'
Committees -- Fiduciary Obligations
Oscar Leak Tyree

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Oscar L. Tyree, Corporate Reorganization -- Bondholders' Committees -- Fiduciary Obligations, 17 N.C. L. Rev. 36 (1938).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol17/iss1/13

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

36

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

harsh. By excluding evidence of any fraudulent representation contradicted by the writing, "dear and convincing" proof of fraud in the
inducement may often be prevented from reaching the jury, thus shielding a wrongdoer.
However, consideration of the California rule (excluding evidence
of a promise made with intent not to perform where the promise is
contradicted by the subsequent writing) might well lehd to the conclusion that this more narrow restriction is a desirable one. By reason
of the necessarily intangible nature of proof of the promisor's state of
mind, i.e., that at the time he made the promise he intended not to
keep it, "clear and convincing" proof of this type of fraud can seldom
be presented. Often the jury must draw the inference of such an
intent from little more than evidence of the making of the promise and
the non-performance of it. In this situation the written contradiction
of the alleged oral promise would seem the more reliable evidence,
where the promisee knew the terms of the writing.2 0 In allowing the
introduction of only the more reliable evidence, California and Texas
make a commendable return to the spirit of the parol evidence rule in
the face of modern tendencies 21 to render uncertain the finality of written instruments.

MARGARET CLOYD JOHNSoN.
Corporate Reorganization-Bondholders'
Committees-Fiduciary Obligations.
T executed a note secured by a pledge of securities, including bonds
of the Y corporation in the amount of $61,000, to the appellant bank.
Subsequently, the Y corporation defaulted on its bonds and a bondholders' protective committee was formed to receive bond deposits in
order to seek a reorganization. The cashier of the appellant bank
became the most active member of this committee.' The Y bonds held
by the bank as collateral security were deposited by agreement between
it and T, and a certificate of deposit was assigned to the bank. T
failed to make a payment on the note and all collateral security was
sold, being bought by the bank as a sole bidder for $5,000. On an
attempt by the bank to prove a claim for the par value of the Y bonds
in a proceeding in corporate reorganization, held, the bank acted under
a fiduciary duty to the bondholders and was not entitled to profit from
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The bank was treated as a member of the committee by the court in this
case. This disregard of the corporate entity in holding that the position of the
cashier was the position of the bank seems reasonable on the facts of the case.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

the purchase of the bonds but only to have its debt with2 T paid in full,
which was done by the other securities furnished by T.
One of the unfortunate results of the depression was a widespread
default in real estate and corporate bond payments.3 When bonds are
in default protective committees, necessary because investors are so
spread out that their interests can only be served by united action, 4 are
formed. Bonds are deposited with them, and they seek a reorganiza
tion, usually by foreclosure and by setting up a new corporation which
takes over the property that secured the bonds. New securities are
issued to the old bondholders in exchange for certificates of deposit
previously given them on depositing their bonds with the committee. 5
The past history of these committees is replete with abuses of their
position by members. 6 The principal source of these abuses has been
the broad powers conferred upon the committees by the deposit agreements together with the fact that the committees have usually been
formed, by the issuing house, as it has been the only one in possession
of a list of bondholders. 7 Consequently reorganization is often more
in the nature of a promotional scheme than a means for investors to
readjust their losses. Aware of this, courts have begun to take a
more active interest in the reorganization proceedings s and recent
2

In re Marquette Manor Bld'g Corp., 97 F. (2d) 933 (C.C. A. 7th, 1938).

"Itwas estimated that out of approximately ten billion dollars of outstanding

real estate bonds, eight billion were in default. Report of the Sabath Committee,
Investigation of Real-Estate Bondholders' Reorganizations, H. R. REP. No. 35,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
'Cary and Brabner-Smith, Studies in Realty Mortgage Foreclosures: V.
Reorganization (1933) 28 ILL. L. Rxv. 1.
12 GERDES, CoRPoRATE REORGANZATIONS (1936) §§987-1014; Rohrlich, Protective Committees (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 670. These committees serve a useful function in reorganizations not only where there has been a default, but also
in reorganizations of going concerns. For example, see Dodge v. Commissioner of
Corporations and Taxation, 273 Mass. 187, 174 N. E. 109 (1930).
6The earlier House of Representatives investigation (supra, note 3) was
followed by a very comprehensive investigation by the Securities and Exchange
Cummission which sets out at length the.practice of these committees. SEcuRrins
AND EXCHANGE CoMMIssIoN, REPORT OF THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE

WoRx, AcnviTEs, PERSONNEL AND FuNcTIoN OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZA'noNr CoMMITTEs (1936-38); note (1935) 35 CoT,. L. REv. 905. Harigan v.

Pound, 239 App. Div. 1, 265 N. Y. Supp. 676 (1st Dep't 1933), presents as an
example of one of these issuing houses, the S. W. Straus & Co., and its practices.
The opinion develops the interesting history of this company. Note (1933) 43
YALE
L. J. 330.
7
For an account of the practices used to secure deposits, see Arbitrationto the
Rescue of the Mortgage Bondholders, BusINEss WEEx, Nov. 2, 1932, pp. 10-11.
Rights of other committees and bondholders to obtain these lists are treated in
In re International Match Corp., 59 F. (2d) 1012 (S.D. N. Y. 1932) (holding
there is no right to these lists). Contra: Bergelt v. Roberts, 144 Misc. 832, 258
N. Y. Supp. 905 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 236 App. Div. 777, 258 N. Y. Supp.
1086 (1st Dep't 1932).
"'Until the last twenty years, the courts, in no uncertain terms, expressed the
view that they had no concern with the business of reorganization. . ..In latter
years, it has been considered as within the court's jurisdiction to examine the
proposed plan and pass upon its fairness." Bethlehem Steel Co. v. International
Combustion Engineering Corp., 66 F. (2d) 409, 412 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933). The
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legislation has replaced former Section 77 B of the Bankruptcy ActO

with new Chapter X, which provides inter alia that a list of all bondholders of the defaulting company must be filed.' 0 The new provisions,
however, were not in effect at the time of the principal case.
Abuses of their position by committee members naturally led to
the now well-established rule that the relationship between those members and the depositing bondholders is a fiduciary one. 1 1 There is an
indication that the relationship extends to non-depositing as well as to
depositing bondholders.'1 Since he is not to participate in the reorganization but to be paid off in cash, the non-depositor's interest is
determined by the sale price of the property securing the bonds at foreclosure. As the committee is often the only one in a position to make
a bid because of the large cash outlay necessary, it is apparent that
important rights of his are subject to the will of the committee.
Once the fiduciary duty has been established, the mere purchase of
the corporation's bonds by a member of the committee constitutes a
breach thereof.' 8 It might appear that it should make no difference to
other bondholders whether a committee member or an outside party
owned the bonds; and, in fact, such purchase might enhance the value
of their interests, as the committee member would then have a greater
interest by the courts seems to date back to the period of the great railroad reorganizations, and arose out of the doctrine in Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S.
482, 33 Sup. Ct. 554, 57 L. ed. 931 (1913).
'48 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. A. §207 (1934).
"Pub. L. 'No. 696, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 22, 1938), §§164, 165, U. S. C.
(Current Service, 1938, No. 4) §§164, 165. There was a provision under 77B
for the filing of lists, but it was discretionary and not mandatory, as is the
provision under Chapter X. Under Chapter X, however, there is no absolute
right to the use of these lists, but only such use as the court prescribes. For
reference, in general, to the changes and effect of the new chapter on reorganizations, see SWANSTROM, CHAPTR TEN, CORPORAz REORGANIZATION UNDER THE

FEDERAL STATUTE (1938); McCaffrey, Corporate Reorganization Under the
-Chandler Bankruptcy Act (1938) 26 CALIF. L. REv. 643; note (1937) 47 YALE
L. J.229.

nBullard v. Cisco, 290 U. S. 179, 54 Sup. Ct. 177, 78 L. ed. 254 (1933);
Parker v. New Eng. Oil Corp., 4 F. (2d) 392 (D. Mass. 1924); Mawhinney v.
Canverse, 177 App.. Div. 255, 102 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1st Dep't 1907) ; Bergelt v.
Roberts, 144 Misc. 832, 258 N. Y. Supp. 905 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 236 App.
Div. 777, 258 N. Y. Supp. 1086 (1st Dep't 1932); note (1927) 41 HARV. L.
REv. 377.
" Parker v. New England Oil Corp., 4 F. (2d) 392 (D. Mass. 1924) ; Bergelt v.
Roberts, 144 Misc. 832, 258 N. Y. Supp. 905 (Sup. Ct. 1932), affd, 236 App. Div.
777, 258 N. Y. Supp. 1086 (1st Dep't 1932) ; Clinton Trust Co. v. 142-144 Joralemon St. Corp., 237 App. Div. 789, 263 N. Y. Supp. 359 (2d Dep't 1933) semble.
Contra: Bund v. South Carolina Ry., 78 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 4th, 1897).
'Johnson v. Loose, 201 Mich. 259, 167 N. W. 1021 (1918), (1918) 28 YALE
L. J. 192; 3 BoGERT, TRusTs AND TRUSTEES (1935) §§485, 543; Hart, The Development of the Rule in Kcech v. Sandford (1905) 21 L. Q. REy. 258. The
rigidness of the rule is explained by a desire to prevent ". . . the 'disintegrating
erosion' of particular exceptions." Cardozo, C. J.in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.
Y. 458, 464, 164 N. E. 545, 546 (1928). For a comprehensive exposition of this
concept of rigidity, see Newcomb v. Brooks, 16 W. Va. 32 (1879).
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interest in the success of the reorganization, which might increase his
diligence. Yet this rationale ignores the fact that the rule is one of
rigidity, based on the twofold proposition that: (1) the fiduciary must
exclude all selfish interest; and (2) act at all times for the benefit of his
cestui. The committee member is treated as the trustee of an express
trust.14
Earlier judicial decisions, 15 subsequently incorporated by the Chandler Act,' 6 recognize that purchase is a breach of trust and deny the
offending committeeman compensation for his services on the committee.
To deny him not only compensation for his services but also all profit
from the bond purchase seems a fairly infrequent penalty for this
breach,T though under 773,18 carried forward in the Chandler Act,19
the trial judge is empowered to limit any claim by the committee member against the debtor to the actual consideration paid therefor, and
there are several state statutes relative to ordinary trustees to the same
effect. 20 But 77 B and the cases decided independently thereof, as well
as the compensation cases and the Chandler Act, fail to distinguish speculative purchases from those made solely to protect the purchaser from
loss on a loan on the security of the bonds.-" To deny the committee
member compensation for his services on the committee merely because
he seeks to protect his loan is to ignore the reason for holding that purchases are a breach of the fiduciary duty. For this purpose the distinction should be made, although there would seem to be no reason to distinguish the two so as to allow either the speculator or purchaser for
Even under the present
protection a profit on the bonds purchased.
'Bullard v. Cisco, 290 U. S.179, 54 Sup. Ct. 177, 78 L. ed. 254 (1933). A
trustee under an ordinary trust indenture commonly stipulates in that indenture
that he may acquire bonds of the issue thereby secured. The trustee is usually
allowed to take advantage of these stipulations before foreclosure, though it is
possible they may be held to be against public policy. However, after foreclosure has been commenced and the trustee enters upon active duties for the
bondholders, he is no longer permitted to exercise his stipulated privilege of

purchase. See DOUGLAS AND SHANKS, CASES AND MATERMIAS ON THE LAW OF
FINANCING BusIKmss UNITS (1931) 137 (h).
In, re Paramount-Publix Corp., 12 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. N. Y. 1935) ; In re
Republic Gas Corp., C. C. H. Decisions 4104 (S. D. N. Y. June 10, 1936) (not
officially reported).
" Pub. L. No. 696, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 22, 1938) §249, U. S. C. (Current
Service, 1938, No. 4) p. 721, §249, BANKRupTCY Acr, ch. X, §249.
'It
re McCrory Stores Corp., 12 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. N. Y. 1935) ; In re
McEwen's Laundry, Inc., 90 F. (2d) 872 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937) semble.

148

STAT.912,

11 U. S. C. A. §207 (b)(10) (1934).

"See note 16, supra.

' CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1931) §2263; S. D. ComP. LAws (1929)
§1219.
'The policy favoring the purchaser for protection as distinguished from the
speculative purchaser is not as great where the loan is made subsequent to his
becoming a member of the committee.
"Claims of stock may, of course, be acquired or disposed of by gift or inheritance, levy of execution under judgments, foreclosure of pledges, or other
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state of the law there is an indication in the principal case that the
committeeman could have made the purchase and retained all the profits
had he given all the other bondholders' notice of his intentions." The
giving of such notice is usually impracticable.
That the committee member in most cases may not profit by his
purchase of the bonds of the insolvent corporation is admitted. But
what may he do? As has been seen, 77 B and the Chandler Act provide that the trial judge "may limit any claim filed by such committee
member... to the actual consideration paid therefor. ''2 4 This would
seem to limit the purchasing committee member to a maximum recovery
of his actual outlay, which maximum recovery would occur only where
the property securing the bonds was equal in value to their face value,
and if this were the case it is almost inconceivable that the corporation
itself would be insolvent. Usually, the return on the claim filed would
be far below that of the face of the claim 25 with the result that the purchaser not only would make no profit but would lose. A more equitable
rule would be one which allowed the purchaser to prove a claim
equal to the par value of the bonds which he has bought but limited
his return to the consideration that he paid for them. This would deny
any profit to the purchaser which is the aim of the rule making purchase
a breach of duty. If this result cannot be reached under a reasonable
interpretation of the Statute it is suggested that the trial judge exercise the discretion vested in him and not impose the statutory penalty.
In the case of the foreclosure of pledges another question arises.
What is meant by "consideration paid therefor"? Where the purchases
are speculative the answer is obvious. But where the purchase is made
to protect a loan does this phrase mean the amount bid at the sale,
often merely nominal, or the amount of the loan? Assuming that only
the bonds on sale secure the loan and that there is no possibility of
collecting a deficiency judgment against the pledgor, the latter construction seems the more equitable, for, as the bonds represent the full return
to the creditor-purchaser from his loan, there is no profit to him from
this purchase if he be allowed to collect the amount of the loan.
Analogous cases support this view.2 6 However, if such a construction
methods unlikely to involve a breach of fiduciary duty." McCaffery, supra note 10,

at 659.
m"The least appellant could have done was to notify all members of the committee of the sale, and under the circumstances we think it was obliged to see
that all bondholders had notice." In re Marquette Manor Bld'g Corp., 97
" See note 18, supra.
F. (2d) 733, 735 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
25Securities and Exchange Commission Report, supra note 6.
1 McClean v. Bradley, 282 Fed. 1011 (N. D. Ohio 1922) ; Marr v. Marr, 73 N.
J. Eq. 643, 70 Atl. 375 (1908).
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is deemed unreasonable 2 7 it is again suggested under the court's discretion that the statute be not applied. If there are other securities protecting the loan it may well be argued that they must be sold and the
funds received therefrom deducted from the amount of the claim of the
purchasing committee member before he is allowed to receive more
than the sum bid for the bonds at the foreclosure sale. Otherwise he
would indirectly profit by the breach of his fiduciary duty not to purchase. An objection to this, however, is the enormous difficulty in accurately ascertaining how much of the sum bid for all the securities was
bid for each.
In the principal case it would appear that the party really suffering
because of the sale of the bonds was their pledgor, T. It has been
seen that the purchase by the bank as a committee member is a breach
of duty to the depositing bondholders as a group. 28 Is it also a breach
as to T who is one of the depositing bondholders? There seems to
be no authority on the precise point. The uniqueness of a situation in
which the pledgor of bonds is also a depositing bondholder and the
pledgee a member of the bondholders' committee furnishes an adequate
explanation for this. There is a strong analogy in the relationship of a
corporate director to stockholders in the corporation. In that situation the weight of authority denies that there is a fiduciary duty owed
by the director to individual shareholders. 29 Yet a growing minority
recognize that there is a fiduciary relationship and demand that the
director make a full disclosure of all relevant facts known to him before
purchasing shares.3 0 For breach of this duty the stockholder may maintain a suit against the director for all profits he has made on the purchase.3 1 Applying the minority rule to the facts of the principal case, it is
evident that if the committee member's purchase was made without a dis" Strictly speaking "consideration paid" would mean only the sum bid at the
foreclosure sale. Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 U. S. 216,
57 Sup. Ct. 423, 81 L. ed. 612 (1936), furnishes a persuasive analogy to this
effect.
' See note 11, supra.

'Cahall v. Lofland, 12 Del. Ch. 299, 114 Atl. 224 (Ch. 1921); Hooker v.
Midland Steel Co., 215 Ill. 444, 74 N. E. 445 (1905); Blabon v. Hay, 269 Mass.
401, 169 N. E. 268 (1929) ; Shaw v. Cole Mfg. Co., 132 Tenn. 210, 177 S. W. 479
(1915); White v. Texas Co., 59 Utah 180, 202 Pac. 826 (1921); O'Neile v.
Ternes, 32 Wash. 528, 73 Pac. 692 (1903).
1 Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232 (1902) ; Dawson v. National Life

Ins. Co. of U. S., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N. W. 929 (1916) ; Stewart v. Harris, 69
Kan. 498, 77 Pac. 277 (1904); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P. (2d)
531 (1932); FLETcHER, CYc. CoRP. (Perm. ed. 1931) §1168; Bigelow, The
Relation of Directors of a Corporation to Individual Stockholders (1915) 81
CENT. L. J. 256; Laylin, The Duty of a Director Purchasing Shares of Stock
(1918) 27 YALE L. J. 731; Smith, Purchase of Shares of a Corporation by a
Director from a Shareholder (1921) 19 MicH. L. REv. 698; note (1933) 19
CORN.
L. Q. 103.
'm Saville v. Sweet, 234 App. Div. 236, 254 N. Y. Supp. 768 (1st Dep't 1932) ;

Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Lettzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 Atl. 77 (1910) ;
Black v. Simpson, 94 S. C. 312, 77 S. E. 1023 (1913).
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closure82 of all facts which might have enabled T 88 to induce a friendly
party to buy the bonds in for it, T has a cause of action against the
committee member. This creates the anomalous situation in which the
committee member is apparently liable to each of two separate parties
for the whole of the profits he has made. However, that there may well
be a fiduciary duty to the individual depositing bondholders is indicated in the principal case by its implication that the committee member
could have retained the profits had he given adequate notice of his
intentions to buy to all bondholders. It would seem highly inequitable to
allow both of these parties to recover from the committee member, thereby subjecting him to a net loss equal to the profits he would have made
but for the fiduciary duties. Indeed, if the member were compelled to
surrender to the bondholders' committee all returns on the bonds above
the amount he actually paid at the foreclosure sale rather than above
the amount of his investment there would be an additional loss. If
only one party is to recover the individual bondholder should be preferred as the bond purchase results in a positive loss to him.8 4 The
bondholders' committee suffers no such loss when it fails to receive the
profits made by the committeeman, but remains in as good a position as
it was before the purchase. The discipline of the offending committee
member which is the object of the rule making him liable to the committee for all profits on his purchases of the insolvent corporation's
bonds is effectuated equally well by giving the profits to the individual rather than to the group. Where, as usually will be the case
in all probability, the individual bondholder has pledged other securities as well as the bonds for the loan to him, there is a well-nigh insurmountable difficulty in determining how much of the profit of the
pledgee-committeeman who buys all the securities at the foreclosure
sale may be attributed to the bonds. In speculative transactions where
the bonds alone are bought the profit is ultimately ascertainable. A
court of equity in the action of the individual bondholder against the
offending committee member could retain the cause 85 until the member's claim for the face value of the bonds is realized in the cor'To make the bank disclose to T would necessitate its giving notice of sale
when its pledge agreement allows sale without notice. In any case, quacre as to
what disclosure would suffice to a pledgor. Of course, where the purchase is made
directly from a bondholder who does not have to sell, disclosure could be made
more simply.

In speaking of the duty of a committee member to non-depositinq bondholders, should this duty extend to parties in the position of T, if he were a nondepositing bondholder?
' We must not overlook the fact, however, that even if T has no recovery,
he will be no worse off than the pledgor ordinarily is following a sale of pledged

securities. The fiduciary duty, if it exists, is a coincidence.
'A possible alternative, but seemingly an undesirable one, would be to order
an appraisal of all securities purchased by the creditor, and to order him to
account to the individual bondholder for profits thus determined to have been made.
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porate reorganization proceedings. The sum above the amount of the
consideration paid for the bonds would then be held in trust for the
individual bondholder.
OscAR LEAK TYREE.

Criminal Law-Grand Juries-Independent Investigations.
Two recently considered legal problems have again brought to the
forefront the long unanswered question as to the power of the grand
jury to make, of its own motion, without a charge from the court or
the solicitor, investigations into violations of the criminal law.
The grand jury of the Guilford Superior Court, serving during the
first half of 1938, undertook, of its own motion, but with the knowledge of the judge and solicitor of that district,1 to conduct an investigation of alleged fraudulent practices in the High Point Democratic
primary of June 4, 1938. The probe was carried out through the subpoenaing of witnesses to appear and answer the grand jury's interrogations. 2' This investigation was not completed at the expiration of the
jury's service; therefore, it made a report to the court, not based specifically on warrants, and pointed out several particular instances where
the election laws had been violated.8 The newly assigned judge denied
the succeeding grand jury authority to proceed with the independent
investigation of the alleged offenses before it made a presentment of the
facts to the court.4 This new grand jury was thus restrained from
exercising the authority countenanced in its predecessor.
Recently the request of the grand jury of the Durham Superior
Court for funds with which to employ special .agents to assist it in
making an investigation was denied on the ground that it lacked the
authority to employ such special investigators, and that the county lacked
the authority to supply funds for such a purpose.5
These instances raise questions as to: (1) whether the grand jury
may, of its own motion, make an investigation of, and a presentment to the court concerning, violations of the criminal law with which
it is acquainted through its own knowledge or observation; (2) whether
it may so act upon information received from a third party; and if such
an investigation is allowed, (3) whether it may subpoena witnesses to
'Greensboro Daily News, July 14, 1938, p. 18, col. 6.
2 Greensboro Daily News, June 23, 1938, p. 1, col. 5; June 24, 1938, p. 22, col. 4.
3

High Point Enterprise, July 12, 1938, p. 10, col. 1.
IIbid.

Durham Morning Herald, Oct. 5, 1938, p. 4, col. 2. In a letter to Hon. Leo

Carr, dated Sept. 21, 1938, Assistant Attorney General Wettach expressed the

opinion, in behalf of Attorney General McMullan, that there does not appear to be
any express provision in the statutes which authorizes a county to employ special
investigators to assist the grand jury; and that an outside detective agency could
not be employed for this purpose without special legislative authority.

